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I. INTRODUCTION

This survey examines cases of the Florida Supreme Court which should
be of particular interest to the real estate lawyer or real estate professional.1
Additionally, this article includes three cases from other courts in order to
sound a warning, hopefully one which is not too late, about the development
of a federal doctrine which could have a significant effect upon real estate
finance. The time period covered by this survey is from July, 1991 to July,
1992.
*

Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center.

1. It does not include a discussion of family law, e.g., the distribution of property upon
divorce, or of probate and trust law issues.
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II. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

A. Brokers
Bidon v. Department of Professional Regulation.2 Justice McDonald
wrote the unanimous opinion.
Bidon's broker refused to return the deposits from two failed deals, and
Bidon successfully sued the broker and won. The amended final judgment
awarded her the return of the deposits, interest, costs and attorney's fees.
She filed a claim with the Real Estate Commission, but it refused to pay the
attorney's fees part of her judgment.
The Florida Legislature created the Real Estate Recovery fund to
protect the public from the improper conduct of licensed real estate brokers
or salesmen. An individual may recover from the fund when he or she has
been unable to recover from the broker or salesman if he or she meets the
statutory conditions. The statute had been amended in 1988 to specifically
3
exclude attorney's fees, but Bidon's claim arose before the amendment.
The court recognized that the critical question in interpreting a statute
was what the legislature had intended. This statute provided reimbursement
only for "actual or compensatory damages." Those terms do not ordinarily
include attorney's fees. It is generally presumed that the legislature
understood the ordinary meaning of the terms it used when enacting a
statute, so the legislature probably did not intend to include attorney's fees
here by providing for "actual or compensatory damages." Furthermore, the
legislature did expressly provide for attorney's fees in the other statute, so
it would have included them in this statute if that was what was intended.
Consequently, the broker's victim could not recover her attorney's fees from
the fund.

B. Condominiums
Palma Del Mar CondominiumAss'n #5 v. CommercialLaundries,Inc.4
Justice Overton wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.
The 1985 version of gection 718.3025 of the Florida Statutes provided
that contracts made with a condominium association for maintenance
services, management services, "or property serving the unit owners" would

2. 596 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1992).
3. Id. at 452 n.2.
4. 586 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1991).
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not be valid and enforceable unless the contract included certain express
provisions.5 The third district had interpreted that section to include
contracts to provide coin-operated laundries. The legislature responded to
that ruling by amending the statute. The amendment stated that the
legislature intended that the statute not apply to contracts "for services or
property made available for the convenience of unit owners . ..such as
coin-operated laundry ...., Subsequently, the second district concluded
that the legislature had not intended that the pre-amendment statute apply
to a lease of laundry space at the condominium. The conflict in decisions
was certified to the supreme court.
The supreme court held that, when trying to interpret a statute, it was
appropriate for a court to consider subsequent legislation as evidence of the
legislature's original intent. It found consideration of a legislative reaction
to a judicial decision, as occurred here, to be particularly appropriate.
Further, the supreme court held that when a court is faced with two
reasonable interpretations of statutory language, the court should choose the
one which would least restrict the right to contract. Both factors led to the
approval of the second district's interpretation that the statute did not apply
to the laundry lease.

5. FLA. STAT. § 718.3025(1) (1985).
Section 7183025(1)(a)-(e) provides:
(1) No written contract between a party contracting to provide maintenance or
management services and an associate which contract provides for operation,
maintenance, or management of a condominium association or property serving
the unit owners of a condominium shall be valid or enforceable unless the
contract:
(a) Specifies the services, obligations, and responsibilities of the party
contracting to provide maintenance or management services to the unit owners.
(b) Specifies those costs incurred in the performance of those services,
obligation, or responsibilities which are to be reimbursed by the association to
the party contracting to provide maintenance or management services.
(c) Provides an indication of how often each service, obligation, or responsibility is to be performed, whether stated for each service, obligation, or
responsibility, or in categories thereof.
(d) Specifies a minimum number of personnel to be employed by the party
contracting to provide maintenance or management services for the purpose of
providing service to the association.
(e) Discloses any financial or ownership interest which the developer, if the
developer is in control of the association, holds with regard to the party
contracting to provide maintenance or management services.
FLA. STAT.

§ 718.3025(1)(a)-(e) (1985).

6. 1986 Fla. Laws ch. 86-175; FLA. STAT. § 718.3025(4).
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Maison Grande Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Dorten, Inc. 7 This was a
per curiam opinion in which Chief Justice Shaw, and Justices Overton,
Barkett, Grimes, Kogan and Harding concurred. Justice McDonald concurred
in part and dissented in part without issuing a written opinion.
The third district had certified the following question:
IS AN ESCALATION CLAUSE IN A CONDOMINIUM RECREATION LEASE THAT WAS ENTERED INTO BEFORE 1975
ENFORCEABLE AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1998, FOR THE ENTIRE
TERM OF THE NINETY-NINE YEAR LEASE, WHERE THE
LESSOR HAS NOT AGREED TO BE BOUND BY FUTURE
CHANGES IN THE CONDOMINIUM ACT?8
The supreme court quickly concluded the answer was yes.
The Florida statute provided that a lease to a condominium of recreational facilities could not contain rent escalation clauses if the condominium declaration was recorded after June 3, 1975, and also prohibited the
escalation, after October 1, 1988, of rental fees based upon an escalation
clause recorded before June 4, 1975. 9 The supreme court relied upon the
precedent, in which this statute's predecessor was invalidated, 10 to hold that
retroactive application of an escalation clause prohibition would violate the
contracts clause of the Florida and United States Constitutions. However, the
difficult question was whether the lessor would be entitled to recover
attorney's fees.
The lease provided for attorney's fees and costs "in any proceeding
arising by reason of an alleged failure of the lessee to perform any of its
duties ... or by reason of an alleged breach ... ."11 The supreme court
recognized that the lessee, in refusing to pay the escalated rent, was relying
upon a statute which was still valid at that moment. Logically if the statute
was then valid, the prohibited escalation clause was then void. The lessee
"must be excused"'12 for its nonperformance of a void clause and, consequently, the lessee should not have been ordered to pay the lessor's
attorneys' fees and costs for the litigation in which the statute was declared
unconstitutional.

7. 600 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1992).
8. Maison Grande Condominium Ass'n v. Dorten, Inc., 580 So. 2d 859, 862 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
9. FLA. STAT. § 718.4015 (1988 Supp.).

10. Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976).
11. Dorten, 600 So. 2d at 464.
12. Id.
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While this conclusion may be justified on public policy grounds,
it is difficult to accept that this was a valid interpretation of the agreement
itself. Does Florida public policy require that parties who rely upon a statute
which is later declared invalid cannot be bound by an agreement to pay their
opponent's attorneys' fees for that litigation, or is that merely the rule in the
absence of an express agreement to the contrary? The latter seems the more
reasonable rule, but it should not apply to this case.
Furthermore, the lease provided for attorneys' fees and costs "in any
proceeding." This clause, however, failed to expressly include attorneys'
fees and costs on appeal, even though the ordinary use of the term "any
proceeding" would seem to include an appellate proceeding. Florida adhered
to the rule that if attorneys' fees and costs are not expressly provided for on
appeal, they are not included.' 3 Consequently, the Maison Grande Condominium lessee was not held liable for them.
C. ConstructionLiens14
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Buck.' 5 Justice Harding wrote the
majority opinion in which Justices McDonald, Barkett and Kogan concurred.
Justice Grimes wrote an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
in which Chief Justice Shaw and Justice Overton joined.
The Florida statute 6 provided that a person who was not in privity
with the landowner could not perfect a mechanics' lien without first serving
the owner with a notice setting forth the basis of the claim.' 7 In this case,
a material supplier claimed a mechanics' lien even though he had failed to
serve the notice on the joint venture which was the landowner. One man,
Vincent J. Pappalardo, was the president and sole shareholder of the
managing partner of the landowner, and also the sole shareholder of the
general contractor, Pappalardo Construction Company. Consequently, the
supplier claimed the notice requirement was inapplicable. The supreme
court agreed.

13. See Ohio Realty Inv. Corp. v. Southern Bank, 300 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 1974).
14. In 1990, the Florida legislature adopted the term "Construction Lien" to replace the
term "Mechanic's Lien." 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-109, creating FLA. STAT. § 713.001. The
author is following the spirit of that legislative change by using the new term, but the author
must note that it is not a term which has yet been widely accepted.
15. 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992).
16. FLA. STAT. § 713.06 (1987).
17. The notice would have to include the lienor's name and address, describe the real
property and also describe the services or materials which had been, or were to be, furnished.
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The supreme court reiterated that mechanics' liens are "purely creatures
of the statute,"18 and consequently, "they must be strictly construed."'19
However, the term "privity" was not defined by the statute. The purpose of
the notice provision was to alert the landowner that there was a subcontractor involved. Having been informed, the landowner could avoid making
payments to the contractor which actually should have been made to the
subcontractor. Thus, the landowner would be protected from having to pay
twice for the goods or services provided by the subcontractor.
Relying on the purpose of the provision, the court held that "privity
[between the supplier and the landowner] is established where, for all
practical purposes, a common identity exists between the owner and the
contractor."20 There were sufficient facts in the record to adequately
support the trial court's finding of fact that the owner and contractor shared
a common identity. An apparently crucial fact was that if the supplier had
attempted to give the notice to the owner, the notice would logically have
been given to Pappalardo. It should be noted that the court also agreed with,
but did not rely upon, the definition found in HarperLumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Teate,21 that "privity requires both knowledge by an owner
that a particular subcontractor is supplying services or materials to the job
site and an express or implied assumption by the owner of the contractual
obligation to pay for those services or materials."' 2
The court also dealt with confusion that had been created when the
legislature amended the statute in 1987.23 Prior to that amendment, when
a lien had been transferred to a surety bond, the statute 4 provided 1) that
the bond must include $100 to cover costs, 2) that attorney's fees were to
be taxed as costs and 3) costs were not to exceed $100. The sum of those
three provisions had been interpreted as a $100 limit on attorneys' fees. The
1987 amendment raised the bond to include $500 to cover costs, but deleted
the limitation on costs. The supreme court here concluded that there was
evidence of legislative intent to eliminate the limit on attorney's fees.

18. Aetna Casualty, 594 So. 2d at 281 (quoting Sheffield-Briggs Steel Prods. Inc. v. Ace
Concrete Serv. Co., 63 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 1953)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 282.
21. 125 So. 21 (1921); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Southern Lumber & Supply Co., 145
So. 594 (Fla. 1932); Floridaire Mechanical Sys., Inc. v. Alfred S. Austin-Draper Tampa, Inc.,
470 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev. denied, 480 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1985).
22. Aetna Casualty, 594 So. 2d at 282.
23. 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-74.
24. FLA. STAT. § 713.24 (1986).
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However, the surety could be liable only to the extent of the $500 bond
intended to cover costs.
The dissenters agreed on the attorneys' fees issue, but could not accept
the majority's definition of privity. Their point seems to be that the majority
opinion illustrated the old adage that hard cases make bad law. It was hard,
under these circumstances, for a judge to deny this supplier a mechanic's
lien because he failed to give the statutory notice. However, by introducing
a new test for privity the majority was introducing unnecessary uncertainty
into mechanic's lien law, an area which already had many too problems.
Moreover, the dissenters accuse the majority of doing it by the process of
liberal construction after they had acknowledged that the statute should be
strictly construed.
DiStefano Construction, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.25 Justice
Harding wrote the unanimous opinion.
DiStefano Construction claimed a mechanic's lien and, as was allowed
by the statute, the landowner transferred the lien to a bond. It was issued by
Fidelity Deposit Company for $26,060 plus costs. DiStefano successfully
foreclosed upon the lien, and the trial court, relying on a provision 26 in the
Florida Insurance Code,27 awarded attorney's fees and costs of $52,400 and
ordered Fidelity to increase the bond to cover that amount.
The supreme court, however, held that the Insurance Code did not
govern attorney's fees awards in mechanic's lien litigation, even if that
litigation was against a bond-issuing insurer licensed by the state. The
applicable provision was section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes which
provided that the prevailing party would be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorney's fee which "must be taxed as part of his costs."2 As the court
had decided earlier in the year in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Buck,
the 1987 amendment to the statute had eliminated the limitation on costs
and, consequently, had eliminated the limitation on the amount of attorney's
fees which could be recovered. However, that did not make those costs
recoverable from the bond issuer. It could be held liable only for the face
amount of the bond. Consequently, Fidelity should not have been ordered
to increase the bond, and the amount that this foreclosure judgment had
exceeded the bond was simply an unsecured judgment.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

597 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1992).
FLA. STAT. § 627.428 (1987).
Id.§ 627.401-.429
Id. § 713.29.
594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992); see supra text accompanying notes 15-24.
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In determining the amount of the attorney's fee, the trial court had not
provided compensation for the hours spent on the issue of the late service
of the contractor's affidavit, an issue which had arisen through the fault of
that attorney. The supreme court reiterated that the award of attorney's fees
is committed to the sound discretion of the judge. Precedent had already
established that attorney's hours could be reduced if the courts found the
hours to be "excessive or unnecessary."' This record contained did not
support any claim that trial judge had abused his discretion in finding these
hours unnecessary.
D. Contractsof Sale
Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkinsy.31 Justice 'Kogan wrote the
unanimous opinion.
The buyer had an option to purchase which, apparently, had been
exercised, establishing a contract of sale. The contract required that the
buyer give notice to set a closing date not later than December 5, 1987, but
he had failed to do so. On February 12, 1988, the seller sent the buyer a
letter declaring the contract to be in default. Then the seller tried to sell the
property to a third person, but the sale fell through because buyer's attorney
called the title insurer and told them about the buyer's "interest." On May
4, 1988, the seller brought this suit against the buyer for breach of contract,
tortious interference with the second sale and slander of title.
On May 10, 1989 (over a year later), the buyer counterclaimed for
specific performance, breach of contract, and tortious interference with a
business relationship. Because section 95.11(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes 32
required that an action for specific performance be brought within one year,
the trial court granted summary judgment for the seller on specific
performance issue. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding
the statute did not apply. It analogized the situation to allowing an otherwise
time-barred counter-claim for recoupment.
The supreme court disagreed. It found two factors militated against
allowing a time-barred counter-claim for specific performance: the public
policy in favor of free alienability of property, and that the remedy of
specific performance is not a matter of right. However, in dicta, the court
suggested that other remedies remain available to the buyer, including

30. 597 So. 2d at 250 (citing Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145
(Fla. 1985)).
31. 585 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1991).
32. FLA. STAT.

§ 95.11(5)(a) (1985).
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rescission which would be subject to a longer statute of limitations.
However, rescission, like specific performance, is an equitable remedy. But
since both may be barred in a shorter time by the doctrine of laches,M it
might not be as available as this dicta might suggest.
Moritz v. Hoyt Enterprises, Inc.3 5 Justice Overton wrote the unanimous opinion.
This case concerned a contract for the purchase of a single-family
house already under construction by the seller when the contract was
entered. The buyers made a ten percent deposit of $57,877.45, but
unfortunately, they soon became dissatisfied. Claiming a breach of the
contract, they repudiated the contract and demanded the return of their
deposit. After selling the house to another purchaser for a lower price, the
seller offered to return only what remained of the buyers' deposit after
deducting its damages due to the buyers' breach. The buyers rejected that
offer and sued for breach of contract and misuse of escrowed funds. The
seller counterclaimed for breach of contract, claiming the entire deposit as
liquidated damages.
The trial court rejected the buyers' claim based upon misuse of the
escrowed funds. It found that the buyers had not suffered any harm from the
sellers' use of the funds and also that the buyers, knowing of the misuse,
had failed to demand that the amount be returned to the escrow account.
The trial court also rejected seller's claim that the deposit constituted
liquidated damages and also rejected the buyers' claim that the seller had
committed a material breach which would excuse the buyers from performing. Therefore, the buyers' repudiation had constituted a breach of the
contract which entitled the seller to recover damages in the amount of the
contract price of the house less its reasonable value at the time of the
breach, plus interest. That totaled $20,579.56. However, the buyers were
entitled to recover the balance of their deposit from the seller which
amounted to $45,525.90. Subsequently, the trial court granted the seller's
motion to tax costs and attorney's fees against the buyers because it was the
prevailing party.
The question on appeal was whether the seller was really the prevailing
party. In Casavan v. Land O'Lakes Realty, Inc.,3 the Fifth District Court

33. It would seem to be either five years under § 95.11(2)(b) or four years under §
95.11(3)j), (k) or (1). Id. §§ 95.11(2)(b), (3)0)-Q).

34. Id. § 95.11(6).
35. 604 So. 2d 807 (1992).
36. 542 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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of Appeal held that the party who recovers the larger portion of the sum in
dispute was the prevailing party. Here, the buyer had recovered more than
twice as much as the seller. However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal37
concluded that the seller was the prevailing party because it had been
awarded damages based upon the buyers' breach of the contract. That, of
course, created a conflict among the districts.
The supreme court, in settling this conflict, decided that "the party
prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should
be considered the prevailing party for attorney's fees." 38 This test had also
39
been used by the United States Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart.
Applying the Hensley test, the Florida Supreme Court held that the seller
had prevailed on the issues of the buyer's breach of contract, the seller's not
breaching the contract, and the seller's misuse of escrow claims. Therefore,
the trial judge "was within his discretion" in granting the seller attorney's
fees and costs.
E. Co-Tenants
Kelly v. Kelly.4" Justice McDonald wrote the majority opinion in
which Chief Justice Shaw and Justices Barkett, Grimes and Kogan
concurred. Justice Harding expressed his dissent in an opinion with which
Justice Overton concurred.
The landowners had been divorced and the decree had converted their
ownership into a tenancy in common. The decree also provided that the
former wife would have possession of the house until the minor child
reached age eighteen when the house would be sold and the proceeds
divided equally. Until then, the former spouses were to divide the burden of
tax and insurance payments. Shortly before the child was to reach eighteen,
the former wife sought a declaratory judgment that, when the proceeds from
the sale were divided, she should get credit for the mortgage payments she
had made.
The former husband counterclaimed, inter alia, for credit for the rental
value of the home while it was occupied by the former wife. Without
elaboration, the court pointed out that a co-tenant who has been ousted from
possession by a court order is not entitled to rental value unless that is

37. Relying upon Reinhart v. Miller, 584 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
38. Moritz, 604 So. 2d 809.

39. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
40. 583 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1991).
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provided for by the order. This divorce decree did not mention credit for the
rental value, so the former husband would not get that it.
The problem, of course, was that the original divorce decree also failed
to deal with mortgage payments. The court, in a footnote4' directed trial
judges in the future to explicitly address the question of who should have
the burden of making mortgage payments and whether a party should get
credit for payments of principal and/or interest at the time of sale. The
court noted that the general rule for tenancies in common is that all owners
are to contribute equally to the maintenance of the property. Consequently,
these tenants in common had equal responsibility to make the mortgage
payments, and the former wife was entitled to credit for her payments of
principal and interest when the property was sold.
Justice Harding dissented, not because he disagreed with the law, but
because he interpreted the final divorce judgment as indicating that the wife
not get credit for the mortgage payment because the decree had provided
that the "net proceeds" from the sale should be divided equally. Moreover,
courts have recognized that the party out of possession, due to divorce,
should be relieved of the burden of mortgage payments if his financial
contributions to the party in possession enabled her to make them, as had
occurred here.
F. Development
St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n, Inc.42 Justice
Grimes wrote the unanimous opinion.
The fifth district had certified, as being of great public importance, the
question of validity of an impact fee on new residential construction to be
used for new school facilities. The county ordinance provided that building
permits would be issued only upon the payment of an impact fee. The fees
were to be spent by the school board for school needs caused by new
development. However, the ordinance would not go into effect in any
municipality until the municipality agreed with the county to collect the
fees. A private builder and an association of builders filed suit to invalidate
the ordinance.
The Florida Supreme Court stated that "[t]he use of impact fees has
become an accepted method of paying for public improvements that must

41. Id. at 668 n.*.
42. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991); Joseph Livio Parisi, Comment, St. Johns County v.
Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n and Florida Sdzool Impact Fees: An Exercise in
Semantics, 16 NovA L. REV. 569 (1991).
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be constructed to serve new growth," but "the propriety of imposing impact
43
fees to finance new schools is an issue of first impression in Florida.t
The court held that impact fees would be upheld if they satisfied a dual
rational nexus test. A rational nexus is a reasonable connection. A dual
rational nexus test simply requires two reasonable connections. Under the
test, the local government attempting to collect an impact fee from the
developer of a subdivision must demonstrate: 1) a rational nexus between
the need for the facilities to be funded by the fees and the growth in
population generated by the subdivision; and 2) a rational nexus between the
expenditure of the collected fees and the benefits accruing to the subdivision. The question was whether this ordinance could pass the test.
Not all new homes would house children. The builders had argued that
those new homes without children would not add to the need for additional
schools and, therefore, the ordinance would fail the first prong of the test.
The supreme court disagreed. Even if a home did not immediately house
students, it might at some later time. Moreover, the county had calculated
that for every one hundred new units built, forty-four students would be
produced who would need to be educated at the public schools. That statistic
was a sufficient rational nexus between the new housing and the need to
construct new educational facilities.
However, the ordinance failed to satisfy the second prong. The
ordinance, by its own terms, was not effective in any municipality which
was not a party to an agreement with the county to collect them. However,
there was nothing in the ordinance to prevent the impact fees from being
spent to accommodate the needs of new development within a nonparticipating municipality. Consequently, the court held that the fees could not be
collected until "substantially all of the population of St. Johns County is
subject to the ordinance." 44
In a footnote, 45 the court acknowledged the possibility that the county
might be able to satisfy the second prong by proving that substantially all
development would occur in the part of the county where the fee was being
collected. However, if development might occur in a nonparticipating
municipality, even prohibiting the expenditure of the funds for schools to
service that development would be inadequate. New schools in the nonparticipating municipalities would have to be paid for out of county-wide ad
valorem taxes and the burden of those taxes would also fall on those paying

43. Id. at 638.
44. Id. at 639.
45. Id. at 639 n.5.
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the impact fees. Thus, those subject to the impact fees would be unfairly
subjected to a double burden.
The court rejected the claim that the use of impact fees to finance
public educational facilities would violate the Florida Constitution's
requirement of "free public schools."' 4 Obviously, that provision did not
prohibit the government from raising money to pay for schools. What it
prohibited was charging tuition. That was not being done because attendance
at public school was not conditioned upon any payment.
However, the ordinance contained a provision, section 7(B), which
allowed the school board to decrease the fee, or even eliminate it, for a
location if evidence was submitted that no children living there would attend
public schools. If resident children later did attend public school, the impact
fee would become due. That narrowed the burden of paying to those who
might use the public schools. That did make it into a user fee which violated
the "free public schools" provision.
But the ordinance contained a severance clause, a provision expressing
the legislative preference that, if the statute violated the constitution, the
court, if possible, should invalidate only offensive clause or clauses rather
than of the entire statute. While a court would not be bound by such a
clause, it would be considered "highly persuasive" and should be followed
if severance would "not impair the operation and effectiveness of the
ordinance." 47 The stated intent was "implementation of the. . . Comprehensive Plan."48 The stated purpose was "to assure that new development
bears a proportional share of the cost of capital expenditures necessary to
provide public educational sites and facilities . . ... 49 The supreme court
concluded that these could be accomplished even without section 7(B) and
so invalidated only that section.
The court rejected the argument that the ordinance violated the Florida
Constitution's requirement that the free system of public education be
"uniform."5° The court pointed out the provision did not require that
physical plant or curriculum be uniform from county to county. Nor did it
require that counties have the same sources or methods of financing. What
the provision required was only that every student have "an equal chance to

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640.
Id. (quoting ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-60 § 3(A) (Oct. 20, 1987)).
1d (quoting ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-60 § 3(B) (Oct. 20, 1987)).
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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achieve basic educational goals prescribed by the legislature." 5' That
requirement had not been violated.
The court also held that the fact that this was an ordinance passed by
the board of county commissioners, rather than the school board, was not
a fatal flaw. While it was true that the constitution gave school boards the
power to levy taxes to finance schools, 52 that was only a grant of power
to the school board, not a limit on the powers of the county commission.
Nor was there any unlawful delegation of power by the county commission
to the school board. The structure provided by the ordinance sufficiently
limited the discretion of the school board when spending these funds raised
by the county commission to implementing the policy decisions made by the
commission.
G. Eminent Domain
Shick v. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services.53 This was
a per curiam opinion in which Chief Justice Shaw and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Grimes and Harding concurred. Justice Kogan wrote a dissenting
opinion with which Justice Barkett concurred.
The Department of Agriculture's program of spraying ethylene
dibromide on orange groves resulted in the contamination of the Shicks'
well, so they claimed, inter alia, a partial inverse condemnation and, at trial,
they prevailed. In awarding attorney's fees,54 the court computed a figure
based upon a rate and the number of hours involved. It then multiplied that
number by a "contingency risk" multiplier to reach the final figure. The
Department appealed. The district court reversed that decision because the
trial court had failed to make specific findings to justify using a fee
multiplier.55 On remand, the trial court issued a detailed order which
supported its use of the multiplier. Again the department appealed.

51. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 641 (citing School Bd. v. State, 353 So. 2d 834
(Fla. 1977)).
52. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b).
53. 599 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1992).
54. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1987) provided that the condemning authority must pay
reasonable costs of the condemnation proceeding including a reasonable attorney's fee. The
department conceded that the successful plaintiff in an inverse condemnation action was
entitled to attorney's fees under this statute. Schick, 599 So. 2d at 642 n.3.
55. Department of Agric. & Consumer Serv. v. Schick, 553 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1989).
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This time the district court also had to consider a new supreme court
decision, Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 6 which held
that when the legislature has set forth specific criteria for determining a
reasonable attorney's fee, a multiplier cannot be used if the statute does not
provide for it. The statute here provided 57 only that:
In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court
shall consider:
(1) Benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered. However,
under no circumstances shall the attorney's fees be based solely on a
percentage of the award.
(2) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved.
(3) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the case.
(4) The amount of money involved.
(5) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
(6) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to
represent the client.m
The enumerated criteria did not include a contingency fee multiplier,
so the district court concluded it should not have been used. However, it
certified the following question:
IN DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD MADE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 73.092, FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE ROWE CONTINGENCY RISK MULTIPLIER APPLICABLE IN AN INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION, BASED UPON A RECORD IN WHICH IT
IS CLEARLY APPARENT THAT IT WAS INITIALLY HIGHLY
UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE CLAIMANTS WOULD PREVAIL ON
59
THE THRESHOLD ISSUE OF A TAKING?
The supreme court held that the answer was no; the Rowe multiplier
should not have been used. "[W]here, as here, the legislature specifically
sets forth the criteria it deems will result in a reasonable award and will
further the purpose of the fee-authorizing statute, only the enumerated

56. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
57. It should be noted that the statute has been significantly amended. See 1990 Fla.
Laws ch. 90-136; see also 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-303 § 3.
58. Schick, 599 So. 2d at 643 n.5.
59. Id. at 641 (citing Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.
1985), modified by Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)).
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factors may be considered." 60 This author cannot help noticing that there
is nothing in the wording of the statute or mentioned by the court to suggest
that the legislature ever intended that the list of factors to be exclusive.
principal embodied in the
Perhaps the court was relying upon the ancient
61
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
The court noted that the trial court had relied upon a number of the
statutory factors in reaching its conclusions, but it was unclear how those
would have been considered if the court had been aware that it could not
use a multiplier to enhance the total. Consequently the case was remanded
so the trial court could redetermine the fees based solely upon the statutory
criteria, but stated in closing, "as we noted in Quanstrom, 'the principles to
be utilized in computing [the] fees must be flexible to enable the [court] 62to
consider rare and extraordinary cases with truly special circumstances.'
Justice Kogan dissented. He noted that, in general, a contingency fee
multiplier is not justified in an eminent domain case because the attorney is
assured of a fee when the action commences, like in family law or trusts and
estates cases. 63 However, "li]nverse condemnation actions clearly do not
belong in this category because entitlement to a fee is not assured until the
property owner prevails on the threshold issue of a taking." 64 Furthermore,
inverse condemnation cases are not the ordinary type of condemnation cases
for which the language in the statute was drafted. Quanstrom contemplated
special circumstances would justify a flexible approach to accomplish the
purpose of the fee-authorizing statute which was to make the property owner
whole. Unfortunately, Justice Kogan does not explain why the property
owner would not be made whole without the multiplier.
It could be that property owners will be unable to entice attorneys to
take inverse condemnation cases without either a big retainer guaranteeing
that the attorney would be paid or a contingent fee arrangement giving the
attorney a share of the award, in addition to the statutory attorney's fee, to

60. Id. at 644.
61. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY
692 (4th ed. 1968).
62. Schick, 599 So. 2d at 644.
63. Compare id. at 644 with In re Estate of Harvey S. Warwick, 586 So. 2d 327 (Fla.
1991) and In re Estate of Lester Platt, 586. So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991). Justice Overton wrote
the opinions which provided that a reasonable compensation for attorneys and personal
representatives could not be computed solely on the basis of a percentage of the amount of
the probate estate; the Lodestar approach is appropriate to determine the amount of the fee;
and the use of a fee multiplier is improper where there is no risk of nonpayment of the fee.
Justice McDonald dissented.
64. Schick, 599 So. 2d at 644. (Kogan, J., dissenting).
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offset the risk of receiving nothing if the case is lost. Since few landowners
will be able to afford paying a big retainer, most will have to use the
contingent fee arrangement. But paying a contingent fee would leave the
property owner with less than just compensation for the property taken. So
the point of the multiplier is to provide an alternative to contingent fees.
However, that is a serious concern with which the court should deal directly.
H. Forfeiture-RICO
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property.65 Justice Barkett
wrote the unanimous opinion. The name of this case unintentionally reflects
the current serious conflict. The issue was whether the possible discouragement of criminal conduct was of such great importance that it outweighed
society's need for individual security in the ownership of private property.
After arresting Charles DeCarlo on drug trafficking charges, the state
began forfeiture proceedings against a number of properties and filed a
notice of lis pendens against them. The circuit court issued warrants to seize
these based solely upon the affidavit of a Florida Department of Law
Enforcement agent. Judge Tench of the Eighth Judicial Circuit dismissed the
forfeiture action because he concluded that the forfeiture statute, as amended
in 1989, 66 facially violated the guarantees of the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions. Specifically the circuit court found that:
1) As a penal sanction, the Act fails to provide substantive due process
required of penal statutes;
2) if not purely penal, the Act is quasi-criminal and fails to provide the
requisite procedural guidelines; and
3) the act is void for vagueness, requiring parties to guess the proper
procedures and protections, and insufficiently requires notice as to what
specific property is subject to forfeiture. 67
The panel of the First District Court of Appeal split and, consequently,
failed to decide the case on the merits. However, it certified the issue to the
Florida Supreme Court.
The supreme court expressed concern over "the multitude of procedural
deficiencies in the Act."' 6 It framed the issue as whether "the Act can
reasonably be construed to comport with the minimal due process require-

65.
66.
67.
68.

588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991).
FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-.704 (1989) (the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act).
Departmentof Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 959.
lId at 968.
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ments." 69 The court recognized the difficulty in applying apparently
contradictory rules of statutory interpretation. Forfeitures are not favored in
law or in equity, so forfeiture statutes should be strictly construed. But a
statute should be construed so that it may be found to be constitutional,
whenever that is reasonably possible. Moreover, the court is limited by the
separation of powers doctrine which prevents the court from legislating so
as to save a statute from constitutional challenge.
The Act enabled the state to "seize" real or personal property, but the
Act had not provided many details about pre-trial or trial procedure and
even the word "seize" was not clearly defined. "The Act can be read to
mean that seizure immediately ousts property owners or lienholders of any
right or interest they have in the subject property. ' 0 The court rejected the
argument that such a seizure need only satisfy the limits placed on search
and seizure by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The court concluded that "[e]ven temporary or partial impairments to
property rights are sufficient to merit due process protection." 71 Moreover,
"[p]roperty rights are among the basic substantive rights expressly protected
by the Florida Constitution. 7 2 Not only are property rights entitled to the
protections of procedural safeguards including notice and an opportunity to
be heard, "the means by which the state can protect its interests must be
narrowly tailored to achieve its objective through the least restrictive
alternative where such basic rights are at stake." 73 The court then provided
the details of what would be required from the preliminary "seizure" to the
trial on the merits.
It provided, inter alia, that: notice of hearings must be served on all
interested parties, including all persons whom the agency knows or with
reasonable investigation should know have a legal interest in the property;
notice and an opportunity for an adversarial hearing must occur before the
seizure of real property; the adversarial probable cause hearing must be
expeditiously completed; the least restrictive means available must be used
to restrain the property through the preliminary stage; the forfeiture petition
must be verified and supported by affidavit; the ultimate issue of forfeiture
must be decided by a jury trial, unless waived; and the burden of proof on
the state is no less than clear and convincing evidence.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 962.
Id. at 961 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.703(1) (1989)).
Id. at 964.
Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 964 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I., §

73. Id.
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The court, thereby, exercised its power to control judicial procedure to
uphold the constitutionality of the statute. The substantive due process
challenge was not really addressed, apparently because the court believed
that the procedure would protect property owners from being victims of
fundamental unfairness. The court concluded: "We hold that the Act is
facially constitutional provided that it is applied consistent [sic] with the
minimal due process requirements of the Florida Constitution as set forth in
this opinion." 74 However, because the claimants in this case had not been
given notice or an opportunity to be heard before their real property was
seized, the trial court was correct in dismissing the forfeiture action.
It should be noted that Justice Barkett also wrote the unanimous
opinion in In re Forfeiture of 1969 PiperNavajo, Model PA-31-310, S/N31-395, U.S. RegistrationN-1717G,75 which does address a substantive due
process challenge. While this case did not concern real estate, it is of
interest because of its implications. The Broward County sheriff seized an
aircraft under section 330.40 of the Florida Statutes because it had fuel tanks
which did not conform to the FAA regulations. The purpose of the
regulations was the enhancement of flight safety in air commerce. Because
the Florida Constitution provides protection for the ownership of private
property76 and for individual privacy from government intrusion,77 government intrusion on property ownership must be narrowly tailored to the
least restrictive means which would accomplish the goal. No court imposed
procedural safeguards could save this statute. In the court's judgment,
forfeiture of the aircraft for this violation was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to the objective of flight safety to satisfy the requirements of
substantive due process.
Also, in In re Forfeiture of 1985 Ford Ranger Pickup Truck,7' the
court decided that the "innocent owner" exception could be interpreted so
as to withstand constitutional challenge. At issue in this case was the
forfeiture of a truck owned jointly by a father and son. The statute provided:
"Property titled or registered jointly between husband and wife by use
of the conjunctives 'and,' 'and/or,' or 'or' shall not be forfeited if the
coowner establishes that he neither knew, nor should have known after

74. Id.at 959.
75. 592 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1992).
76. FLA CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9.
77. FLA. CONST.art. I, § 23.
78. 598 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1992).
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a reasonable inquiry, that such property was employed or was likely to
be employed in criminal activity." 79
The trial court had held that this provision violated due process and equal
protection by exempting only some co-owned property from forfeiture.
The district court reiterated the principle that if a statute can be fairly
construed so as to comply with the constitution, the court should do so to
avoid having to declare it unconstitutional. The subsection provided, in
addition to the one sentence quoted above, that "[n]o property shall be
forfeited.., if the owner of such property establishes that he neither knew,
nor should have known after a reasonable inquiry, that such property was
being employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity."' 8 The
supreme court approved the district court's decision that the sub-section
should be construed to prohibit the forfeiture of the interest of any innocent
co-owner.
I. Landlord and Tenant
Goodman v. BrasseriaLa Capannina,Inc.81 Justice McDonald wrote
the unanimous opinion.
The tenant operated a restaurant on the leased premises. When the
tenant allegedly failed to pay the rent, the landlord claimed a lien on the
personal property located there82 and filed a verified complaint for a writ
to distrain it. On the day that the complaint was filed, the court held an ex
parte hearing and granted the distress writ.
Two days later, an emergency hearing was held on the tenant's motion
to modify the distress writ to exclude the food and alcohol it needed to
continue to operate its restaurant. The tenant was unsuccessful. A second
emergency hearing was held the same day. That hearing concerned the bond
which the tenant would have to post in order to replevy its property. But
once the bond was set, the unfortunate tenant was unable to post it. 83
A month later, the tenant sought to have the distress writ dissolved,
claiming that the distress statute was unconstitutional. The trial court did not
find the argument convincing, but the district court of appeal did, holding
that the statute, on its face, violated the requirements of due process
79.
(July 1,
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2) (1989) (amended by Fla. Laws ch. 92-54, § 3
1992)).
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2) (1989)).
602 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1992).
See FLA. STAT. § 83.08 (1989) (used by landlord as authority for lien).
Goodman, 602 So. 2d at 1246.
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provided by the United States Constitution.' The supreme court disagreed.
The appropriate due process requirements85 had been summarized by
the Florida Supreme Court in 1977 in Phillipsv. Guin & Hunt, Inc.86 as:
(1) the writ shall not issue without judicial authorization;
(2) the writ may issue only upon the allegation of specific facts;
(3) the party seeking to invoke a writ is required to post a bond to
guarantee the tenant's interests;
(4) the tenant has the opportunity to obtain an immediate hearing to
dissolve a writ; and
(5) there is the opportunity for a prompt hearing on the merits, though
not necessarily a predeprivation hearing.s7
These requirements accommodated the conflicting needs and rights of
the landlord and the tenant. The legislature had responded to Phillips by
amending the statute to conform s and the landlord had complied with the
statute. Here, the supreme court rejected any suggestion that Phillips needed
to be modified.89
The tenant was unable to convince the supreme court that the due
process clause required that the judicial officer weigh the varying interests
of the parties before issuing the writ. The court did state that the judge has
the "discretion" to make the required determinations even though section
83.12 seems to provide mandatory language. 90 However, once the judge
has concluded that the landlord has satisfied the statutory requirements, the
statute does not seem to give the judge any discretion about whether to issue
the writ.
The 1980 amendment had included the addition of section 83.135
which provided that "the [tenant] may move for the dissolution of the
distress writ at any time. The court shall hear the motion not later than the

84. Id.
85. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974) and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975).
86. 344 So. 2d 568, 571 (Fla. 1977).
87. Id.
88. 1980 Laws of Fla. ch. 80-282.
89. The court distinguished Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), which
required a hearing before an employee's wages could be garnished. Goodman, 602 So. 2d
at 1249 n.8.
90. Section 83.12 provides that "[a] distress writ shall be issued .... " FLA. STAT. §
83.12 (1989).
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day on which the sheriff is authorized.., to levy on the property ....
The supreme court recognized that the statute might still be applied in an
unconstitutional way when the writ "completely prevents a tenant from
conducting its business ... ."92 However, there had been "ample opportunity for immediate hearings" 93 and there had been judicial supervision
"throughout the distress writ process," 94 so this trial court had not violated
the requirements of due process.
The Florida Bar; Re: Approval of Forms Pursuantto Rule 10-1.1(b)
of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.9 By this unanimous per curiam
opinion, the supreme court approved for publication a number of forms,
mostly landlord and tenant forms, for the use on non-lawyers. The landlordtenant forms included: Notice From Landlord To Tenant-Termination For
Failure to Pay Rent; Notice From Landlord To Tenant-Termination For
Noncompliance Other Than Failure to Pay Rent; Notice From Tenant To
Landlord-Termination For Failure of Landlord to Maintain Premises As
Required By Florida Statute 83.51(1) Or Material Provisions Of The Rental
Agreement; Notice From Tenant To Landlord-Withholding Rent For Failure
of Landlord To Maintain Premises As Required By Florida Statute 83.51(1)
Or Material Provisions of the Rental Agreement; Complaint For Landlord
To Evict Tenants For Failure To Pay Rent And To Recover Past Due Rent;
Complaint For Landlord to Evict Tenants For Failure To Comply With
Lease (Other Than Failure to Pay Rent); Summons-Eviction Claim;
Summons-Damages Claim; Final Judgment-Damages; Final Judgment
Eviction; Writ of Possession; and Notice of Intention To Impose Claim On
Security Deposit. The court also approved the following forms: Satisfaction
of Mortgage; Satisfaction of Judgment-County Court; Satisfaction of
Judgment-Circuit; and Document For Sale of Goods.6 In addition, the
court authorized the publication of instructions for filling out the forms
prepared by The Florida Bar.
The court, however, expressly refused to state any opinion on the
correctness of either the forms or the instructions. The court's disclaimer
seems to be a giant step backwards in any attempt to make the courts more
accessible to the public and to strengthen the public's confidence in the legal

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. § 83.135 (1981).
Goodman, 602 So. 2d 1248.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
591 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1991).
Id. (These forms are included in the appendix to the case).
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system. On being told that the supreme court had approved forms for
publication but refused to say if they were correct, a member of the public
would probably respond first with laughter, and then with the common
complaints and expletives about the legal profession. It would seem that the
supreme court's saying that these are correct forms ought to make these
forms "correct" and if the court is not comfortable in doing that, it should
not authorize these forms be published.
Furthermore, the court noted that use of the forms might vary from
circuit to circuit due to local procedure, and so authorized the chief judge
in each circuit to prepare supplemental directions which should be filed with
the circuit court clerk. So much for simplifying things for the general
public!
In a subsequent opinion, The Florida Bar Re: Advisory OpinionNonlawyer Preparationof Residential Leases Up to One Year in Duration, 97 the court also approved the publication of forms for leases, not
exceeding one year, of: 1) a single family home or duplex; 2) a residential
apartment, mobile home or unit in multiple unit housing, including a mobile
home; or 3) a residential condominium or cooperative. The court authorized
a non-lawyer to elicit factual information to help another to complete the
form under Rule 10-1.1(b), so long as no legal advice about the meaning of
the terms or drafting of addenda is involved.
J. Mortgages
Florida National Bank v. Bankatlantic.98 Justice Overton wrote the
majority opinion in which Justices McDonald, Barkett and Kogan concurred.
Justice Grimes wrote a dissent with which Chief Justice Shaw concurred.
For the first time, the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the
question of whether a lender could collect a prepayment penalty after having
exercised its right to accelerate a mortgage obligation which had fallen into
default. The case involved the mortgage on an apartment complex. The
owner had decided the complex would be most valuable if converted from
rentals to condominiums. Rather than do it himself, he decided to find a
buyer who would undertake the conversion. To make the property more
saleable, he did not renew leases which expired and he stopped leasing units
to new tenants.
In planning for the sale, he repeatedly asked the lender to waive the
prepayment penalty if the property was sold, but the lender always refused.

97. 602 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1992).
98. 589 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1991).
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He found a buyer, contracted to sell the complex and stopped making the
mortgage payments. The lender sent him routine default letters and then
began a foreclosure action. In order to allow the sale to be consummated,
the mortgagor agreed to escrow the prepayment penalty so the lender would
agree to execute a mortgage satisfaction. This action was over the prepayment penalty.
The district court recognized thegeneral rule that, absent an express
agreement to the contrary, a lender cannot both accelerate a debt and
demand a prepayment penalty. The mortgage and note involved did not
provide that the lender was entitled to both. However, the district court
continued: "it is axiomatic that a party to a contract should not profit from
his own intentional default."" The supreme court agreed. It pointed out
that "[f]oreclosure actions are litigated in a court of equity, and chancellors
of those courts traditionally have been granted the discretion and authority
to do justice between the parties, particularly in circumstances where one
party is attempting to profit from his own intentional misconduct." 1°° The
supreme court also noted that even if the default had ultimately been caused
by the lack of cash flow, the cash shortage had been caused by the
borrower's own decision to eliminate the tenants to make the property more
saleable. Consequently, this default was intentional.
The certified question and the facts of this case involve only a
mortgage on commercial property. 0 1 However, there is nothing in the
reasoning which would seem to prevent this precedent from being applied
to a mortgage on residential property. It should, however, be noted, that the

99. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Bankatlantic, 577 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
100. Bankatlantic,589 So. 2d at 259.
101. The certified question was:
WHETHER IN COMMERCIAL VENTURES, WHERE THE NOTE CONTAINS BOTH A PROVISION FOR ACCELERATION AND A PROVISION
FOR PREPAYMENT PENALTY FEES, AND THE MORTGAGEE HAS
ELECTED TO ACCELERATE THE MORTGAGE BECAUSE OF AN
INTENTIONAL DEFAULT BY THE MORTGAGOR, WHO SUBSEQUENT
TO NOTIFICATION OF FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS BUT PRIOR TO
A FORECLOSURE SALE, HAS CONSUMMATED A PRIVATE SALE OF
THE PROPERTY, IS ITWITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWER
TO CONSIDER THE EQUITIES AND ALLOW BOTH PROVISIONS TO BE
EFFECTUATED SIMULTANEOUSLY DUE TO THE PREMATURE
TERMINATION OF THE MORTGAGE?

Id. at 256.
The court responded, "[wie have jurisdiction, answer the question in the affirmative, and
approve the district court's decision." Id. (citation omitted).
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court created only a limited exception to the general rule "under the special
circumstances of this [case]."'1 2 The case seemed to indicate only that a
lender could collect a prepayment penalty if the facts indicate that the
borrower tried to reap the benefits of prepaying by forcing the lender into
foreclosing.
Justice Grimes dissented. He agreed with the majority's statement of
the general rule and the exception. However, he concluded that "if evidence
such as this is sufficient to prove an intentional default, the exception will
swallow the rule."' 0 3 He simply found evidence that the default was
intentional to be insufficient by applying the following logic. The complex
was purchased as a tax shelter, not to generate revenue and the revenue had
never been sufficient to cover the mortgage and operating expenses. The
borrower had subsequently sustained a significant reversal of fortune. He
missed mortgage payments because he was broke, rather than as a subterfuge to avoid the prepayment penalty. Selling the complex had become the
only alternative to losing it to creditors. Furthermore, "[t]he bank officials'
testimony that in retrospect that they believed that Gordon intentionally
defaulted in order to avoid the prepayment penalty was irrelevant, if not
inadmissible." 104
What both the majority and dissent failed to discuss was the nature of
the prepayment penalty clause.'0 5 The common law rule was that a
borrower had no right to prepay a mortgage debt, unless the parties had
specifically agreed to permit it, because the mortgagee was entitled to
receive the benefit of the loan agreement, i.e., the payment of principal and
interest as agreed. Therefore, the practice evolved of allowing the borrower
to purchase the privilege of prepaying for a certain price. This gave the
borrower the option of performing by paying over the full term of the
mortgage or prepaying with the agreed "penalty." With this in mind, the
analysis of the case should have focused, not upon whether the borrower's
conduct was wrongful, but rather upon whether the lender was entitled to
the prepayment penalty as part of the bargained-for benefit of this contract.
Clearly, both parties anticipated that the lender would be entitled to recover
the penalty if the property was sold unless the lender agreed to allow the
buyer to assume the obligation. Since that did not occur, this lender was
entitled to the penalty.

102. Id. at 259.
103. Id. at 260 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
104. Bankatlantic,589 So. 2d at 260.
105. See generally GEORGE E. OSBORNE F-l. AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw
6.3 (1979).
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K. ProfessionalResponsibility
The Florida Bar v. Belleville.'10 This was an unanimous per curiam
opinion.
An attorney was retained by the buyer after the terms of an apartment
building purchase had already been agreed upon. The attorney drew up the
closing documents which provided that the seller would receive only an
unsecured promissory note which would become unenforceable upon seller's
death. Interest was to be deferred for four months without any provision for
interest to accumulate. The seller would pay the closing costs, which the
seller and his attorney interpreted to include the attorney's fee. Furthermore,
the closing documents included the conveyance of not only the seller's
apartment building, as the parties had agreed, but also the seller's residence
which was across the street.
The elderly seller signed the closing documents without realizing that
his residence was included. The closing documents were not explained to
him by the attorney who merely sent a paralegal to handle the closing. In
fact, the buyer never even met this attorney. When the seller subsequently
complained that the note and documents did not reflect their agreement, the
buyer tried to evict him from his residence. Disciplinary proceedings were
commenced against the attorney for his part in the transaction. From the
record, it could not be determined if the attorney did any more than follow
his client's instructions. Consequently, the referee recommended no
discipline be imposed because of the lack of an attorney-client relationship
between the attorney and the seller. °7 That logic was rejected by the
10 8
supreme court.
The essential facts were not in dispute, so the question was entirely one
of law. The supreme court concluded that the facts were so one-sided that
Belleville should have suspected that unconscionability was involved. Under
those circumstances, he had two duties to the unrepresented opposing party:
1) to explain that he represented only his client, the seller; and 2) to explain
the material terms of the documents "so that the opposing party understands
their actual effect."10 9 Those duties arose even though an agreement by
one party to pay the other's attorney's fees does not necessarily create a
dual representation situation. The breach of those duties by the attorney
compelled the imposition of a thirty day suspension from practice.

106.
107.
108.
109.

591 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1991).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
Id.
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It is interesting to note what the court did not do. It did not go so far
as to require that attorneys who prepare closing documents attend the
closing in order to explain the documents."' Nor did it require that
attorneys refrain from participating in transactions which they perceive to be
unconscionable. Perhaps the court should.
The FloridaBar v. Crabtree."' This was an unanimous per curiam
opinion.
A client hired an attorney to secretly "repatriate $1.5 million from
Europe." There was no allegation that the purpose was illegal, but to do
it, the lawyer devised numerous complex transaction which involved another
client and which also gave the lawyer a personal interest in the assets. He
failed to reveal these facts to either client. In addition, he created phony
letters to disguise the transactions. Although none of the parties involved
filed any complaint, the referee concluded that the lawyer had violated:
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation; Disciplinary Rule 5-104(A) by entering into a business transaction with
a client without making full disclosure to the client or obtaining the client's
consent; and Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) by simultaneously representing two
clients who could have adverse interests without their knowledge or
consent.

113

The supreme court concluded that the referee's findings of fact were
supported by the record. Noting that the lawyer had already received a
private reprimand for similar conduct, the court concluded that the referee's
recommendations of disbarment were also supported by the record and,
consequently, the court ordered the lawyer disbarred. 14
This case was decided under the Code of Professional Responsibility
which was replaced on January 1, 1987 by the Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar. 15- However, there should be no doubt, although there is no dicta to
that effect, that similar results would also be reached under the new rules.
Rule 4-4.1 prohibits a lawyer from making a false statement of material fact
to a third person. Rule 4-1.8 provides that a lawyer may not enter into a

110. Id. at 172 n.2.
111. 595 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1992).
112. Id. at 936.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The Florida Bar, Re: Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977, 978 (Fla.
1986).
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business transaction with a client unless "the transaction and terms on which
the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are
fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client ...
116 and the
client "consents in writing thereto." n 7 Rule 4-1.7 prohibits a lawyer from
representing clients with conflicting interests unless each client has
consented "after consultation.0 118 Further this rule provides that the
consultation "shall include explanation of the implications of the common
representations and the advantages and risks involved." 9
Hopefully no lawyer needs to be reminded that producing phony
documents in order to mislead the innocent is prohibited conduct. However,
potential conflict of interest situations may be more difficult for the lawyer
to avoid or resist. It may not be unusual for a lawyer to consider the
investing in a client's project which has the earmarks of success. Nor is it
unusual for a real estate lawyer to be asked to handle a real estate sale for
both the buyer and the seller. However, lawyers need to be reminded that
these are potential minefields. Full disclosure is the minimum, and even full
disclosures rarely are successful at making the disclosee understand the
impact of a potential conflict of interest. If the client does not understand,
then the lawyer has failed as a advisor. It is essential to remember that:
A lawyer preforms various functions. As an adviser, a lawyer provides
a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and
obligations and explains their practical implications. As an advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system. As a negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous
to the client but consistent with the requirements of honest dealing with
others. As an intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile
their interests as an adviser and, to a limited extent, as a spokesman for
each client. A lawyer acts as an evaluator by examining a client's legal
affairs and reporting them to the client or to others.' 20

Even following the fullest disclosure, a disappointed party may subsequently
fix the blame for the disappointment on the real or imagined failure of his
attorney to perform one of those functions properly.

116. RuLEs REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-1.8(a)(1) (1991).
117. Id. Rule 4-1.8(a)(2).
118. Id. Rule 4-1.7(a)(2).
119. Id. Rule 4-1.7(c).
120. RULEs REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, ch. 4 (Rules of Professional Conduct,
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities).
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L. Purchase Options
Taylor v. Fusco Management Co. 121 Justice Harding wrote the
unanimous opinion.
The ninety-nine year lease provided that the lessee would have the
option to purchase the property:
[Ulpon an appraisal made by three competent MIA Appraisers, one of
whom shall be appointed by Lessors, one appointed by Lessee, each of
whom shall mutually select a third such appraiser, but in no event shall
the sum be less than $720,000.00 net to Lessors, their heirs or assigns,
and Purchasers to assume all unpaid mortgage obligations against said
property.'2
Litigation over exercising the option had begun in state court but was
removed to federal court by the defendant, a successor lessee. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that the case
was controlled by Florida law, but that there was no Florida precedent to
follow. Consequently, it certified the following question to the Florida
Supreme Court:
WHETHER THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF LEASED PROPERTY
AT THE TIME A LESSEE EXERCISES AN OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY IS THE VALUE OF THE FEE SIMPLE
ESTATE UNENCUMBERED BY THE LEASE OR THE VALUE OF
THE FEE ESTATE ENCUMBERED BY THE LEASE.123
The court pointed out that it had decided a similar case, Lassiter v.
Kaufman, 24 just last year. Justice Harding also wrote that opinion which
had involved interpreting a lessee's option to purchase the "fee title." But,
this case, Taylor, did not involve similar contractual language to interpret.12
121. 593 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1992).
122. Id. at 1046.
123. Id. at 1046; see also Taylor v. Fusco Management Co., No. 90-3288, slip op. at

4 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 1991) (providing the certified question).
124. 581 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1991); see also Ronald B. Brown, RealProperty:1991 Survey
of FloridaLaw, 16 NOVA L. REV. 399, 405-07 (1991).
125. The Lassiter court answered the following certified question in the affirmative:
IN THE DETERMINATION OF FAIR MARKET VALUE OF LEASED
PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF THE EXERCISE OF A LESSEE'S OPTION
TO PURCHASE, MAY THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDER THE PRESENT
VALUE OF THE FEE UNENCUMBERED BY THE LEASE?

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 17

In Lassiter,Justice Grimes, in a concurring opinion, had unsuccessfully
proposed the adoption of a general rule to eliminate the confusion produced
by such vague option drafting. He stated, "in the absence of specific
language to the contrary in the lease, I would hold that the option price
would always be computed as if the property were unencumbered by the
lease .....126 In Taylor, the court expressly adopted Justice Grimes'
proposal. The court stated that "[a]ny intent to value the property otherwise
127
[than unencumbered by the lease] should be clearly stated in the lease."'
M. Quiet Title Actions and Defenses
McIntosh v. Hough.'28 Justice Grimes wrote the majority opinion in
which Chief Justice Shaw and Justices Barkett, Kogan and Harding joined.
Justice McDonald wrote a dissent in which Justice Overton concurred.
Hough was a judgment debtor. To escape having to pay the judgment,
he conveyed all of his property to his wife. When the judgment creditor
sued to set aside the fraudulent conveyance, Hough made arrangements to
obtain the money he needed to pay of the judgment. But rather than
reconveying as she had agreed, Hough's wife conveyed the property to a
corporation which she owned. So Hough sued to force a reconveyance.
Notice of lis pendens was properly recorded.1 29
But the wife's corporation conveyed the property to Miles and Miles
later conveyed a half interest to McIntosh. At this point, neither Miles nor
McIntosh knew about Hough's claim or his suit to recover title. When
Miles did learn about it, he petitioned to intervene, but was prevented from
doing so because Hough objected. After the lis pendens expired, Miles
conveyed his remaining interest to McIntosh who still did not know about
Hough's suit. When Hough prevailed in the suit against his wife, he
brought this quiet title action against Mclntosh. 3 0
The supreme court, agreeing with the district court,' 3 ' held that the
i3 2
expiration of the lis pendens made it "ineffective for any purpose.' 1
Therefore, the half interest which McIntosh acquired after the lis pendens
expired was not subject to Hough's claim. However, the supreme court

581 So. 2d at 147.
126. Id. at 149.
127. Taylor, 593 So. 2d at 1047.
128. 601 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1992).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1171.
131. Id. at 1171 n.2.
132. Id.
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rejected the district court's conclusion that McIntosh could not raise the
defense of unclean hands. The district court had certified the question as
being:
WHEN A PURCHASER FOR VALUE AFTER LIS PENDENS BUT
WITHOUT ACTUAL NOTICE PURCHASES PROPERTY FROM
THE FRAUDULENT GRANTEE AND THEN IS DENIED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE IN THE PENDING ACTION,
MAY HE RAISE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BY VIRTUE OF THE
UNCLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE IN A SUBSEQUENT
ACTION
133
BROUGHT BY THE FRAUDULENT GRANTOR?
An action to quiet title is equitable in nature and a party seeking that
relief must have clean hands. But the supreme court pointed out that this
requirement did not make equitable relief unavailable to every party whose
behavior has been disreputable in any way. Rather, it made equitable relief
unavailable to a party whose conduct has been the cause of the harm. It did
not matter that this harm was not intended. Here, McIntosh was not the
intended victim of Hough's fraudulent conveyance, but was an incidental
victim because "it was this fraud which ultimately convinced [McIntosh] to
purchase the property ..
,13
Consequently, having unclean hands
would be a valid defense to Hough's quiet title suit. The supreme court
apparently recognized the distinction between the estoppel and clean hands
and, consequently, did not apply estoppel to this case, despite the formulation of the certified question and the estoppel cases offered as authority by
Hough.135 However, it seems clear from the court's discussion of those
precedents, that this court would also allow an incidental victim of fraud to
raise equitable estoppel in an appropriate case.
Whether McIntosh will prevail upon remand is less than clear. The
decision merely allows him to raise the unclean hands defense. Even if
Hough cannot quiet his title, where does that leave McIntosh? He did not
have clean hands either because he acquired an interest while the lis pendens
was in effect, unless he performed a good faith title search and which failed
due to no fault of his, such as misrecording or misindexing by the clerk. He
too would be unable to quiet title to this land. That would produce a
serious, and perhaps insoluble, title problem.

133. Mcdntosh, 601 So. 2d at 1170.
134. Id. at 1173.
135. See Miller v. Berry, 82 So. 764 (Fla. 1919); Watkins v. Watkins, 166 So. 577 (Fla.
1936).
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The dissent also focused upon the half interest that was conveyed to
McIntosh while the lis pendens was in effect. 136 The doctrine of lis
pendens provides that the purchaser of property which is subject to litigation
takes title subject to the outcome of that litigation. Consequently, when
Hough prevailed in that litigation, the outcome was binding on McIntosh
too. While this author applauds the majority's interpretation of the
availability of the clean hands doctrine, in this case the dissent was correct.
N. Surveyors
Garden v. Frier1 37 This was a per curiam opinion in which Justices
Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Grimes and Harding concurred. Chief Justice
Barkett wrote a special concurrence in which Justice Kogan joined, but
Justice Kogan also wrote an opinion concurring only with the court's result.
A land surveyor was sued for performing an allegedly negligent survey.
Because the suit was commenced more than two years after the error was
discovered, the surveyor raised the two-year statute of limitations applicable
to "professional" malpractice 38 as an affirmative defense. The problem,
however, was that term "professional" was not defined by the statute.
The court had earlier stated that for the purposes of this statute an
occupation would be considered a profession "if, under the laws and
administration of this state a person can be licensed to practice [the]
occupation upon completion of a four-year college degree in that field...
,,3 In Garden, the court specified that this would be an absolute
requirement. 140 "[A] vocation is not a profession if there is any alternative
method of admission that omits a required four-year undergraduate degree
or a graduate degree."'14' Since the Florida statute 4 2 did allow alternatives,
the court concluded surveying was not a profession to which the malpractice
statute of limitations could be applied.
Chief Justice Barkett agreed that statute of limitations did not apply
because, she concluded without explanation, that the professional malpractice statute of limitations was unconstitutional on its face. Justice Kogan
also agreed, but explained that the statute was fatally vague. The legislature,

136. McIntosh, 601 So. 2d at 1173.
137. 602 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1992).
138. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1989).

139. Pierce v. AALL Ins. Co., 531 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 1988).
140. 602 So.2d at 1275.
141. Id. at 1276.
142. FLA. STAT. § 472.013 (1991).
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by failing to define the term professional, had simply left too big a gap for
the court to fill.

III. CONCLUSION
This small sampling of cases is not particularly revealing about the
supreme court. It is somewhat surprising that almost two thirds of the
decisions were unanimous. Justices Harding, McDonald and Overton each
wrote three opinions. Justice Grimes wrote two. Justices Barkett and Kogan
each contributed one. Chief Justice Shaw did not write an opinion or
dissent, but that may reflect the degree to which administrative tasks have
infringed upon his time.
More real property cases were decided by the court this year than in the
recent past. Most cases involved interpretation of language, or the lack of
language, in a statute or document. The court dealt with these problems in
conventional and common-sense ways, but it would be helpful if the court
would identify the methods of statutory interpretation being used by their
traditional labels or Latin terms. It was also surprising how frequently
attorney's fees was an issue, in almost one third of the cases. There was
nothing in these cases which should take the real estate professional by
surprise. In contrast, the following cases involving the D'Oench doctrine
may be a very unpleasant surprise to many. Their existence should remind
the real estate community that knowledge of only real estate law is no
longer enough to protect our clients or ourselves.

IV. POST SCRIPT: A WORD OF WARNING
143
ABOUT THE D'OENcH DOCTRINE
Three cases, not decided by the Florida Supreme Court, should also be
of particular interest (or horror) to Florida real estate lawyers because they
provide an introduction to the D'Oench doctrine. The doctrine originated in
1942 in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.144 In D'Oench, the Federal

143. The doctrine is also referred to as the D'Oenc, Duhme doctrine, referring to the
first two words of the seminal case rather than just the first word. This author will use the
shorter identifying term.
144. 315 U.S. 447 (1942); see also Jane D. Goldstein, Langley v. FDIC: FDIC
Superpowers-A License to Commit Fraud,1989 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 559 (1989); Marsha
Hymanson, BorrowerBeware: D'Oenc, Duhme and Section 1823 Overprotect the Insurer
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Deposit Insurance Corporation received a demand note as part of the
collateral securing a loan which the FDIC had made to a bank. When the
FDIC subsequently tried to collect from the note's maker, it learned that the
bank had agreed in writing that it would not sue on the note.145
The United States Supreme Court held that the maker could not assert
that defense against the FDIC.146 The court discovered a federal policy
which existed to protect the FDIC against misrepresentations about the
assets and liabilities of the banks which it insured or to which it made
loans.147 Therefore, as a matter of federal common law, the maker of the
note could not rely upon an undisclosed agreement which diminished the
value of the note to the detriment of the FDIC.148
The policy of D'Oench was the basis of Title 12 of the United States
Code, section 1823(e), a part of Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950.149
Section 1823(e) provided:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the
Corporation [i.e., the FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this
section or section 1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or as
receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid against the
Corporation unless such agreement(1) is in writing,
(2) was executed by the depository institution and any person
claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor,
contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the
depository institution,
(3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository
institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected
in the minutes of said board or committee, and

When Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 253 (1988); Stephen W. Lake, Banking Law, The
D'Oench Doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e): Overextended, But Not Unconstitutional,43
OKLA. L. REv. 315 (1990).
145. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 454.
146. Id. at 459, 461.
147. Id. at 457.
148. Id. at 459.
149. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, ch. 967, § 2[13](e), 64 Stat. 889 (1950) (as
amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (e)). These provisions initially applied only to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, but Congress made them applicable to the RTC in 1989.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4) (1989); Resolution Trust Corporation v. Murray, 935 F.2d 89,
93-94 (5th Cir. 1991).
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(4) has been, continuously, from the time 5 of its execution, an
official record of the depository institution.' 0

In Sunchase Apartments v. Sunbelt Service Corp., Sunbelt Savings
was created to acquire the assets of a failed savings and loan which was
under the receivership of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Sunbelt Savings operated under the supervision of the FDIC.
Sunbelt Service Corporation was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sunbelt
Savings and it brought this mortgage foreclosure action.
However, the mortgagor had a defense. It claimed that its agreement to
purchase property, an apartment complex, from a third party was conditioned upon negotiating a satisfactory loan from Sunbelt and that, during
negotiations with the lender, it had promised that it would modify the loan
by reducing the principal and/or interest to allow at least a break-even cash
flow if the mortgagor went through with the purchase, completed renovations and kept the loan current for four months. The mortgagor claimed it
had purchased and had executed the mortgage in reasonable reliance upon
those representations. The mortgagor also asserted that these facts not only
established a defense to the foreclosure, but also provided the basis for a
counter-claim for damages, rescission and reformation based upon the
theories of estoppel, waiver, failure of consideration, and fraud in the
inducement.
Unfortunately, the lender's records did not contain any documents
reflecting such representations or agreements. Based upon the D'Oench
doctrine, the trial court granted summary judgment to Sunbelt and the
district court affirmed. It held that the mortgagor's defenses and counterclaims were based upon an alleged oral agreement with the lender or its
employees. The D'Oench doctrine could be asserted by federal banking
regulators, or their successors in the mortgaged property like the Plaintiff
here.'52 The D'Oench doctrine prohibits any defense or counterclaim based
upon secret or side agreements with a regulated bank, i.e., any agreement
not in the banks official records or contained within the four corners of the
loan documents. Therefore, the court properly granted summary judgment
because the mortgagor had not raised any admissible defense or counter153
claim.

150.
151.
152.
153.

12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) (West 1989).
596 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 126.
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A similar result was reached by the Fifth Circuit in Resolution Trust
54
Corp. v. McCrory.1
Charles McCrory and First Florida Management
Association (FFMA) were the general partners in NPT, a Florida limited
partnership. When NPT acquired property, it assumed the seller's mortgage
obligations, but the lender simultaneously executed a letter agreement
limiting the liability of FFMA and its general partners, Walter McCrory and
Thomas Ryan.
The lender's files did not contain a copy of the agreement, but a copy
of the agreement was in the file for "draft" documents of the attorney who
handled the closing for the lender. In addition, two documents in the
lender's files did refer to the letter agreement, but they did not disclose the
limitation of liability. There was no record of the letter agreement or the
liability limitation in the minutes of the loan committee. There was
testimony that the loan committee had not considered or approved the
assumption agreement because the transaction was not considered a
restructuring of the original note, but that the chairman of the senior loan
committee had approved the transaction, including the limitation of liability.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board declared the lender insolvent and
appointed FSLIC to be its receiver. The lender's assets, including the note
which NPT had assumed, were transferred to Sunbelt pursuant to an
acquisition agreement between FSLIC and Sunbelt. Following default on the
payments, Sunbelt accelerated the indebtedness and sued to recover on the
note. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Sunbelt,
finding that the absence of the letter agreement from Sunbelt's files entitled
Sunbelt to the protection of the D'Oench doctrine which prevented FFMA,
and its general partners Walter McCrory and Thomas Ryan, from relying on
the letter agreement to limit their liability. 55
Subsequently, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) declared Sunbelt
insolvent and appointed the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) as its
receiver. RTC transferred the judgment on the note to Sunbelt Federal
Savings, FSB (Sunbelt Federal). OTS placed Sunbelt Federal into conservatorship and appointed RTC conservator. RTC consequently succeeded to all
rights of Sunbelt Federal, including the right to collect the final judgment
in this case. RTC argued two grounds for affirmance. First, RTC contended
that the district court properly applied D'Oench to the facts of this case. In
15 6
the alternative, RTC invoked section 1823(e).

154. 951 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1992).
155. Id. at 70.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
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Section 1823 was raised for the first time on appeal because it could
not have been asserted by Sunbelt.157 The statute did not apply until RTC
stepped in as conservator and acquired the final judgment which had already
been rendered. The court explained that, in such situations, federal regulators
have been permitted to assert their special defenses under the statute for the
first time on appeal, but when the district court's judgment establishes that
an asset is void, federal regulators appointed after the entry of judgment
have not been allowed to assert arguments based on D'Oench and section
1823(e) for the first time on appeal as an basis for reversing the district
court's judgment.
The defendants argued that having the letter agreement in the files of
the bank's attorney, who kept offices in the same building and on the same
floor, should be sufficient to meet the requirement. The court rejected this
argument, deciding to "hew closely to the 'plain terms of the statute."'15 8
It noted that the Supreme Court has been unwilling to provide any equitable
exceptions to the operation of the statute because the statutory purpose "is
to allow federal and state bank examiners to rely on a bank's records in
evaluating the worth of the bank's assets"'159 and "[o]ften, such an evaluation must be done literally overnight."t 6°
The defendants also disputed the correctness of the district court's
interpretation of the D'Oench doctrine. But, the court avoided that "thornier
question" 6 1 by relying upon the statute which it found provided "a clear
statutory standard which is dispositive of the outcome in this case." 62
In Glen Johnson, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp.'63 the act was
interpreted to prevent a third mortgagee from asserting that the first
mortgagee, an insolvent savings and loan, had made oral misrepresentations
which might result in the first mortgage being equitably subordinated to the
third mortgage. The third mortgagee, a contractor, was also the original
owner of the property. It sold the property to the mortgagor and, as part of
the deal, the contractor-seller was to build a hotel on the land. The deal,
contingent on the obtaining construction financing, required that the

157. These provisions initially applied only to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), but Congress made them applicable to the RTC in 1989. See 12 U.S.C. §
1441[a](b)(4) (1989); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Murray, 935 F.2d 89, 93-94 (5th Cir. 1991).
158. Resolution Trust Corp., 951 F.2d at 72.
159. Id. (quoting Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91 (1987)).

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 598 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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construction lender "set aside" $1,000,000 to cover the balance of the
purchase price and $3,700,00 for the cost of construction. Seller delivered
an executed deed to the escrow agent with instructions not to release it until
a "set aside letter" had been received from the lender, agreeing to set aside
the funds mentioned above. Seller approved a draft of the set aside letter
presented by the lender's attorney and authorized the release of the deed.
However, the letter which was actually executed contained an additional
term, a term which required the buyer provide a $1,000,000 letter of credit
at closing. The lender, after recording the deed, partially funded the loan.
Then the lender informed the mortgagor that it would make no further
advances until it had received a $1,000,000 letter of credit.
The seller-contractor attempted to help the buyer obtain the letter of
credit. Finally, the seller-contractor convinced the lender to continue funding
the project by agreeing to pledge $250,000 as security, withheld from its
first application for payment. In return, the seller-contractor obtained a third
mortgage on the property. But upon completion, the seller-coritractor was
never reimbursed for the $250,000. Then buyer defaulted on the first
mortgage and the construction lender, whose mortgage had been converted
to a permanent first mortgage, began foreclosure, joining the sellercontractor as third mortgagee.
The seller-contractor-third mortgagee defended and sought affirmative
relief. Its theory was that it had been misled by the set aside letter shown
to it by the lender's attorney. It claimed that it never would have agreed to
close if it had known about the requirement that the buyer have a $1,000,000 line of credit and that, consequently, the lender's first mortgage should
be equitably subordinated to its third mortgage. The trial court had agreed,
but rejected the seller's claim for damages based upon the theory of
promissory estoppel.' 64 The third mortgagee appealed.
Subsequently, the lender, a federal savings bank, was declared insolvent
and the Resolution Trust Corporation was appointed its receiver. The RTC
filed a motion in the appellate court to dismiss the appeal because section
1823(e) shields the FDIC and the RTC from claims or defenses based upon
an agreement not continuously in the official record of the lending
institution. Unfortunately for the third mortgagee, the term "agreement" had
been interpreted to include misrepresentations.165 Consequently, the RTC
was entitled to judgment.

164. Id. at 83.
165. Id. (construing Langley, 484 U.S. at 92-93).
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These cases illustrate the problem for real estate lawyers in dealing
with federally regulated lenders. It is imperative that the entire agreement
be embodied in the basic loan documents. Side agreements may prove
illusory because they cannot be asserted against a successor to the lender.
But that is something that borrowers can understand and live with if they are
aware of this doctrine before making the deal. That the agreements are on
the side is a natural source of suspicion. The more difficult problem, though,
is that D'Oench or its statutory offspring may cause subsequent modifications or additions to the original agreement to also become ineffective. How
can the borrower possibly insure that these documents actually are placed
in and continually remain in the files of the lender? Structuring the
documentation of any subsequent modification or cancellation of the loan
so that it is immune from the D'Oench doctrine may provide the ultimate
challenge.

